Analyse des comportements des djihadistes sur Twitter

Twitter, a network of microblogging, quickly became popular and developed until several hundreds of millions of active users. However, not all users do any honest activities on this social network. Indeed, the platform serves many extremists to combat on the internet and recruit. It is therefore necessary to combat this phenomenon. For this purpose, the data of several jihadist accounts have been extracted, with the aim of studying their networks.

The conflict spreads

The threat generated by the Islamic State in Syria towards the Western countries is to this day very problematic and a reality. The attacks multiply in Western Europe, and the conflicts do not seem to be resolved in Iraq and Syria either. The struggle, however, is not only effected in the physical world. Indeed, this one deferred on the Internet, which became a continuity of the battlefields. Social networks are starting to fight the phenomenon, the recovered accounts are removed very quickly. However, the gangrene is already present in social networks, using it as a means of propaganda and recruitment.

Twitter profile of an extremist user

These accounts must be found at source

In this paper, we have been interested in the relationships that extremist accounts have between them, but also with the networks they train on twitter. It is also important to be able to easily find the new accounts created by the jihadists. We have therefore investigated whether a routine during creation could be detected. If this routine did exists, it must have left observable traces even if the account is still blank of any action. Although many social networks may be affected by the jihadist phenomenon, we have focused uniquely on Twitter in this work.

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Methodology

The data available to achieve these goals are public and obtainable through the Twitter API. In the mass of information that Twitter is, the first step has been to find an access point, a means of obtaining terrorist accounts. Once these were obtained, the interactions of these accounts with the external accounts were studied, in order to be able to estimate the profile of an extremist account, as well as the profiles of the accounts interacting with it. Finally, the network has been observed as a whole, in order to observe possible hooking points or regrouping zones.
Over 170,000 tweets from 4,000 accounts were retrieved via Python scripts, and about 400,000 twitter profiles were recorded. The accounts of users following at least two jihadist accounts or being followed by at least two jihadists accounts were studied. The collected tweets were also separated into groups and then compared.
Finally, the results were analyzed and evaluated, in order to try to meet the expectations of this work.
It has been possible to find newly created accounts as well as discovering elements of jihadist›s networks.